# ADA Round 2 v Kentucky GV

## 1NC

### Kritik

#### Drones are a minor symptom of US militarism- the aff’s myopic focus solves nothing but obscures the bigger picture and enables militarism

Trombly, 12 – Caerus Analytics, LLC National Security/International Affairs analyst

[Daniel, "Drones are a symptom, not a cause," 5-23-12, slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/drones-are-a-symptom-not-a-cause/, accessed 9-2-13, mss]

Drones have yet to be used in a situation where a pilot of a manned strike platform would have been at serious risk from something besides a plane crash. In practice, in these kinds of campaigns the most vulnerable people are those operating on the ground to support drone operations, and more of them, not fewer of them, are brought in to support so-called drone wars. But does the lack of accident threat increase bellicosity? Not really, since again, in virtually all theaters of drone use, drone strikes occur where manned strikes or manned ISR support is also occurring. These aircraft are also at accident risk, yet they are often used alongside drones or to fulfill missions that drones also carry out. While again, on paper, drones remove these risk, in practice the kind of missions policymakers employ drones with does not suggest drones have significantly changed their calculus towards waging standoff strike campaigns. Policymakers are relying on drones The United States is only “relying” on drones in Pakistan, and even then, in Pakistan it’s also operating Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams on the ground and other proxy militia forces, and very likely receiving the kind of manned ISR support that drones very frequently do in Afghanistan (along with strike support in that theater, of course). The “unique capabilities” of drones do not change the calculus to actually initiate military action, they just change the relative logistical load of the operation. That’s not a revolution and that’s hardly enough evidence to suggest it significantly effects U.S. bellicosity or the accountability of warmaking by giving policymakers a cost free option for prosecuting strikes. In Yemen and Somalia, policymakers almost certainly are not relying on drones. The first drone strikes in Somalia did not occur until years after the U.S. had begun using JSOC ground forces, helicopters, gunships, and naval aircraft and ship fires to target the ICU and later al Shabaab. Even then, drones have yet to actually take over the duties of strike missions, as the F-15E squadron in Djibouti suggests. In Yemen, the strikes have generally been a mix of platforms that has ranged from drones, to seaborne fire missions, to manned aircraft. So it’s certainly not an undisputed fact that policymakers are relying on drones, even if this factor is publicly played up by the media and government alike. If anything, drones are over-emphasized to hide the very many people operating on the ground and in manned supporting strike and ISR platforms that are involved in these wars. It’s absolutely false to suggest that it’s casualty aversion or drone expendability which enables these conflicts, or otherwise policymakers would not be using manned missions in Yemen and Somalia (and they would probably be more willing to conduct high-value strikes when Pakistan clamps down on strikes). Farley suggests that policymakers are not casualty tolerant of air wars. This is false. In fact, the utter air superiority of U.S. forces has been invoked for the ease of conducting U.S. airpower interventions in the Balkans and Iraq after 1991. There’s significant evidence to suggest that policymakers consider aerial and naval assets writ large, along with deniable and covert SOF assets, more expendable than regular ground troops from the Army and the USMC. The record of U.S. military interventions suggests this. Casualty aversion from ground troops did not prevent the growth of an airpower mystique among policymakers which allowed for interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq between 1991-2003, and later, Libya. The punitive use of aerial and standoff fires is extended to virtually all aerial assets, and in many cases policymakers are more eager to send manned aircraft against enemy air defenses than they are to send unmanned strike aircraft into contested areas. If Farley was arguing, as many other commentators have, that there is a general airpower mystique, that would be a much more plausible argument. But the conduct of U.S. military interventions since 1991 suggests that policymakers are not very worried about pilot casualties (even after the shoot-down of an F-16 in Bosnia and an F-117 in the Kosovo War), and drone strikes rarely occur when there’s a real threat of pilot casualties beyond the accidents that can afflict the manned strike and ISR assets used alongside them. Drones make policymakers more prone to use force This is highly unlikely. As I have noted, in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, drone use has been dependent on both militarily and diplomatically permissive environments, and they are generally used alongside [non-drone]manned assets, proxy forces, special operations, and security force assistance to other states. In other words, there are a variety of militarized options which are employed concomitantly which all suggest drone strikes were not the limiting factor in the U.S. choosing to find a variety of direct and indirect methods for covertly and overtly killing foes determined to be hostile to the country. Secondly, the fact that the U.S. also uses the Pursuit Teams and other covert actors in Pakistan suggests that the U.S. would still be trying to kill its enemies across the borders if drones were not available. In Yemen there isn’t convincing evidence that drones are the reason the U.S. chose to militarize its policy there, as the increase in strikes starting in 2009 came with an increase in [non-drone]manned and naval strikes. In Somalia, drones are definitively not the reason the U.S. chose to militarize its counterterrorism policy there, as U.S. strikes in support of the American-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 were all of a manned variety. Thirdly, there’s little suggestion that drones are blinding policymakers to the virtues of riskier means of force, an example of which that Farley cites is SOF. But SOCOM has expanded enormously alongside the growth of the drone program, and SOCOM and JSOC are operating on the ground in far far more countries than we use drones! Not only that, but JSOC, CIA SAD operators, and proxy forces such as contractors, militia groups and foreign military forces are all in play in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan. Standoff strikes are always and everywhere just one prong of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy – even the kinetic aspects. If anything, the biggest advantage to policymakers of drones, in terms of initiating and continuing use of force, is that they allow policymakers to obscure and misinform the public and the international community – and each other – as to the extent of the military and covert campaign. But that’s not drones eluding accountability and enabling bellicosity, it’s secrecy and the management of public perceptions. The CIA had methods of doing this thing before today’s remotely-operated weapons were invented. Back in the day, when you wanted to avoid the bad publicity of USAF or USN platforms getting formally involved in “shadow wars” (and they often were anyway, as they very obviously are now), you started a secret air force. Former USAF or USN airframes, crewed and often even supported by foreign nationals or deniable covert operators. This was what happened in Cuba and the Congo. Drones make very little difference in the ability of policymakers to militarize U.S. foreign policy approaches. They are insufficient for action in military impermissive airspace, and they are almost always used alongside manned assets, and they are always used alongside covert ground or proxy forces. This is why I greatly admire the work of national security journalists (the first coming to mind being Jeremy Scahill and Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady) who sketch out not simply the new hotness that is killer robots, but the full spectrum of direct and indirect methods that are by necessity and by preference used along side drone attacks, such as SOF, manned platforms, naval assets, spies, mercenaries, unsavory foreign security services, militias, warlords, and even terrorists previously targeted by the U.S. to attack America’s real and imagined enemies in places like Yemen and Somalia. Criticism that exalts the mythical capabilities of drones to conduct cost-free, casualty-free campaigns in fact enables to prosecution of unaccountable wars. Why? Because it’s not having the option of drones which make the policymakers responsible for determining the mission and demanding warheads put to foreheads decide to do so. If it was, then we’d see being drones used in the expendable, cost-free ways that our comprehensive strike campaigns and covert wars suggest is not occurring. Instead, the exaltation of these game-changing features of drones, which will be eagerly swallowed by the broader public, if not by critics of the war on terror, is often parroted by the fears of drone critics, which give policymakers the ability to obscure the extent of the “drone wars” and what is really going on. It’s not drones that decrease accountability or increase bellicosity. It’s secrecy and bureaucratic politics. Drones don’t truly offer any advantages in terms of secrecy or bureaucratic politics that did not already exist or are not being cultivated alongside drones by other branches of the military and intelligence community. Even the much-vaunted ability that drones give the CIA to conduct military-grade “secret wars” was pioneered aerially by the “instant air forces” of the Cold War that it set up, as well as other proxy assets with which the CIA can emply and is now employing in its modern shadow conflicts. The very same compartmentalization and secrecy that protect the drone campaign also protects the activities of [non-drone]manned strike missions, SOCOM, CIA assets, and U.S.-backed proxy forces. Drones only marginally alter the kind of impunity that U.S. air superiority gave American policymakers to launch its airpower interventions of the 1990s and 2000s (themselves, as Carl Schmitt foresaw in the 1950s, an outgrowth of naval technology). What’s at least slightly novel about these campaigns is the way in which bureaucracies and secrecy have been utilized to obscure policymakers use of all manner of overt and covert strike, ground, intelligence and proxy assets from proxy criticism, even though even this was essentially cultivated during the Cold War. Perhaps some day in the future drone capabilities will improve enough that they will actually encourage the lack of accountability and bellicosity that critics blame for them. But the record of drone usage so far suggests that the evasions of accountability and enablings of bellicosity in question are equally available to [non-drone]manned assets, standoff naval assets, and deniable covert assets. Drones have yet to be responsible for a single militarization of a U.S. CT campaign that would not have been militarized by the concomitant use of other assets. They’re a symptom of the post-Iraq decision to conduct comprehensive shadow conflicts against AQAM ( arguably pioneered in the Horn of Africa long before strike drones showed up), not from what we can observe in the conduct of drones so far, a cause of its direction. They are a useful instrument in the toolbox. But it’s the toolbox, not any one tool in it, that’s shaping policy. Giving the drones the kind of hype they receive from critics and proponents alike shifts debate obscures what’s really allowing policymakers to conduct today’s wars.

#### Sanitization of US policy leads to endless violence and imperialism – turns case

Bacevich, 5 -- Boston University international relations professor

[A. J., retired career officer in the United States Army, former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005), The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War, 2005 accessed 9-4-13, mss]

Today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with military power. The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys--and is bent on perpetuating-has become central to our national identity. More than America's matchless material abundance or even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation's arsenal of high-tech weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and what we stand for. When it comes to war, Americans have persuaded themselves that the United States possesses a peculiar genius. Writing in the spring of 2003, the journalist Gregg Easterbrook observed that "the extent of American military superiority has become almost impossible to overstate." During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces had shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that they were "the strongest the world has ever known, . . . stronger than the Wehrmacht in r94o, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power." Other nations trailed "so far behind they have no chance of catching up. ""˜ The commentator Max Boot scoffed at comparisons with the German army of World War II, hitherto "the gold standard of operational excellence." In Iraq, American military performance had been such as to make "fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seem positively incompetent by comparison." Easterbrook and Booz concurred on the central point: on the modern battlefield Americans had located an arena of human endeavor in which their flair for organizing and deploying technology offered an apparently decisive edge. As a consequence, the United States had (as many Americans have come to believe) become masters of all things military. Further, American political leaders have demonstrated their intention of tapping that mastery to reshape the world in accordance with American interests and American values. That the two are so closely intertwined as to be indistinguishable is, of course, a proposition to which the vast majority of Americans subscribe. Uniquely among the great powers in all of world history, ours (we insist) is an inherently values-based approach to policy. Furthermore, we have it on good authority that the ideals we espouse represent universal truths, valid for all times. American statesmen past and present have regularly affirmed that judgment. In doing so, they validate it and render it all but impervious to doubt. Whatever momentary setbacks the United States might encounter, whether a generation ago in Vietnam or more recently in Iraq, this certainty that American values are destined to prevail imbues U.S. policy with a distinctive grandeur. The preferred language of American statecraft is bold, ambitious, and confident. Reflecting such convictions, policymakers in Washington nurse (and the majority of citizens tacitly endorse) ever more grandiose expectations for how armed might can facilitate the inevitable triumph of those values. In that regard, George W. Bush's vow that the United States will "rid the world of evil" both echoes and amplifies the large claims of his predecessors going at least as far back as Woodrow Wilson. Coming from Bush the war- rior-president, the promise to make an end to evil is a promise to destroy, to demolish, and to obliterate it. One result of this belief that the fulfillment of America's historic mission begins with America's destruction of the old order has been to revive a phenomenon that C. Wright Mills in the early days of the Cold War described as a "military metaphysics"-a tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means. To state the matter bluntly, Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in U.S. history, Americans have come to define the nation's strength and well-being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals? Already in the 19905 America's marriage of a militaristic cast of mind with utopian ends had established itself as the distinguishing element of contemporary U.S. policy. The Bush administrations response to the hor- rors of 9/11 served to reaffirm that marriage, as it committed the United States to waging an open-ended war on a global scale. Events since, notably the alarms, excursions, and full-fledged campaigns comprising the Global War on Terror, have fortified and perhaps even sanctified this marriage. Regrettably, those events, in particular the successive invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, advertised as important milestones along the road to ultimate victory have further dulled the average Americans ability to grasp the significance of this union, which does not serve our interests and may yet prove our undoing. The New American Militarism examines the origins and implications of this union and proposes its annulment. Although by no means the first book to undertake such an examination, The New American Militarism does so from a distinctive perspective. The bellicose character of U.S. policy after 9/11, culminating with the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has, in fact, evoked charges of militarism from across the political spectrum. Prominent among the accounts advancing that charge are books such as The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, by Chalmers Johnson; Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for Global Dominance, by Noam Chomsky; Masters of War; Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire, edited by Carl Boggs; Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, by Clyde Prestowitz; and Incoherent Empire, by Michael Mann, with its concluding chapter called "The New Militarism." Each of these books appeared in 2003 or 2004. Each was not only writ- ten in the aftermath of 9/11 but responded specifically to the policies of the Bush administration, above all to its determined efforts to promote and justify a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. As the titles alone suggest and the contents amply demonstrate, they are for the most part angry books. They indict more than explain, and what- ever explanations they offer tend to be ad hominem. The authors of these books unite in heaping abuse on the head of George W Bush, said to combine in a single individual intractable provincialism, religious zealotry, and the reckless temperament of a gunslinger. Or if not Bush himself, they fin- ger his lieutenants, the cabal of warmongers, led by Vice President Dick Cheney and senior Defense Department officials, who whispered persua- sively in the president's ear and used him to do their bidding. Thus, accord- ing to Chalmers Johnson, ever since the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, Cheney and other key figures from that war had "Wanted to go back and finish what they started." Having lobbied unsuccessfully throughout the Clinton era "for aggression against Iraq and the remaking of the Middle East," they had returned to power on Bush's coattails. After they had "bided their time for nine months," they had seized upon the crisis of 9/1 1 "to put their theories and plans into action," pressing Bush to make Saddam Hussein number one on his hit list." By implication, militarism becomes something of a conspiracy foisted on a malleable president and an unsuspecting people by a handful of wild-eyed ideologues. By further implication, the remedy for American militarism is self-evi- dent: "Throw the new militarists out of office," as Michael Mann urges, and a more balanced attitude toward military power will presumably reassert itself? As a contribution to the ongoing debate about U.S. policy, The New American Militarism rejects such notions as simplistic. It refuses to lay the responsibility for American militarism at the feet of a particular president or a particular set of advisers and argues that no particular presidential election holds the promise of radically changing it. Charging George W. Bush with responsibility for the militaristic tendencies of present-day U.S. for- eign policy makes as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover culpable for the Great Depression: Whatever its psychic satisfactions, it is an exercise in scapegoating that lets too many others off the hook and allows society at large to abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass. The point is not to deprive George W. Bush or his advisers of whatever credit or blame they may deserve for conjuring up the several large-scale campaigns and myriad lesser military actions comprising their war on ter- ror. They have certainly taken up the mantle of this militarism with a verve not seen in years. Rather it is to suggest that well before September 11, 2001 , and before the younger Bush's ascent to the presidency a militaristic predisposition was already in place both in official circles and among Americans more generally. In this regard, 9/11 deserves to be seen as an event that gave added impetus to already existing tendencies rather than as a turning point. For his part, President Bush himself ought to be seen as a player reciting his lines rather than as a playwright drafting an entirely new script. In short, the argument offered here asserts that present-day American militarism has deep roots in the American past. It represents a bipartisan project. As a result, it is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, a point obscured by the myopia and personal animus tainting most accounts of how we have arrived at this point. The New American Militarism was conceived not only as a corrective to what has become the conventional critique of U.S. policies since 9/11 but as a challenge to the orthodox historical context employed to justify those policies. In this regard, although by no means comparable in scope and in richness of detail, it continues the story begun in Michael Sherry's masterful 1995 hook, In the Shadow of War an interpretive history of the United States in our times. In a narrative that begins with the Great Depression and spans six decades, Sherry reveals a pervasive American sense of anxiety and vulnerability. In an age during which War, actual as well as metaphorical, was a constant, either as ongoing reality or frightening prospect, national security became the axis around which the American enterprise turned. As a consequence, a relentless process of militarization "reshaped every realm of American life-politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations-making America a profoundly different nation." Yet Sherry concludes his account on a hopeful note. Surveying conditions midway through the post-Cold War era's first decade, he suggests in a chapter entitled "A Farewell to Militarization?" that America's preoccupation with War and military matters might at long last be waning. In the mid- 1995, a return to something resembling pre-1930s military normalcy, involving at least a partial liquidation of the national security state, appeared to be at hand. Events since In the Shadow of War appear to have swept away these expectations. The New American Militarism tries to explain why and by extension offers a different interpretation of America's immediate past. The upshot of that interpretation is that far from bidding farewell to militariza- tion, the United States has nestled more deeply into its embrace. f ~ Briefly told, the story that follows goes like this. The new American militarism made its appearance in reaction to the I96os and especially to Vietnam. It evolved over a period of decades, rather than being sponta- neously induced by a particular event such as the terrorist attack of Septem- ber 11, 2001. Nor, as mentioned above, is present-day American militarism the product of a conspiracy hatched by a small group of fanatics when the American people were distracted or otherwise engaged. Rather, it devel- oped in full view and with considerable popular approval. The new American militarism is the handiwork of several disparate groups that shared little in common apart from being intent on undoing the purportedly nefarious effects of the I96OS. Military officers intent on reha- bilitating their profession; intellectuals fearing that the loss of confidence at home was paving the way for the triumph of totalitarianism abroad; reli- gious leaders dismayed by the collapse of traditional moral standards; strategists wrestling with the implications of a humiliating defeat that had undermined their credibility; politicians on the make; purveyors of pop cul- turc looking to make a buck: as early as 1980, each saw military power as the apparent answer to any number of problems. The process giving rise to the new American militarism was not a neat one. Where collaboration made sense, the forces of reaction found the means to cooperate. But on many occasions-for example, on questions relating to women or to grand strategy-nominally "pro-military" groups worked at cross purposes. Confronting the thicket of unexpected developments that marked the decades after Vietnam, each tended to chart its own course. In many respects, the forces of reaction failed to achieve the specific objectives that first roused them to act. To the extent that the 19603 upended long-standing conventions relating to race, gender, and sexuality, efforts to mount a cultural counterrevolution failed miserably. Where the forces of reaction did achieve a modicum of success, moreover, their achievements often proved empty or gave rise to unintended and unwelcome conse- quences. Thus, as we shall see, military professionals did regain something approximating the standing that they had enjoyed in American society prior to Vietnam. But their efforts to reassert the autonomy of that profession backfired and left the military in the present century bereft of meaningful influence on basic questions relating to the uses of U.S. military power. Yet the reaction against the 1960s did give rise to one important by-prod: uct, namely, the militaristic tendencies that have of late come into full flower. In short, the story that follows consists of several narrative threads. No single thread can account for our current outsized ambitions and infatua- tion with military power. Together, however, they created conditions per- mitting a peculiarly American variant of militarism to emerge. As an antidote, the story concludes by offering specific remedies aimed at restor- ing a sense of realism and a sense of proportion to U.S. policy. It proposes thereby to bring American purposes and American methods-especially with regard to the role of military power-into closer harmony with the nation's founding ideals. The marriage of military metaphysics with eschatological ambition is a misbegotten one, contrary to the long-term interests of either the American people or the world beyond our borders. It invites endless war and the ever-deepening militarization of U.S. policy. As it subordinates concern for the common good to the paramount value of military effectiveness, it promises not to perfect but to distort American ideals. As it concentrates ever more authority in the hands of a few more concerned with order abroad rather than with justice at home, it will accelerate the hollowing out of American democracy. As it alienates peoples and nations around the world, it will leave the United States increasingly isolated. If history is any guide, it will end in bankruptcy, moral as well as economic, and in abject failure. "Of all the enemies of public liberty," wrote James Madison in 1795, "war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies. From these proceed debts and taxes. And armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few .... No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual Warfare." The purpose of this book is to invite Americans to consider the continued relevance of Madison's warning to our own time and circumstances.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC.

#### Trying to restrict and regulate the self inevitably fails and destroys value to life – interrogation of the 1AC forces self-reflection and self-shaming that enables us to engage with the political in emancipatory ways

Ojakangas 13, Mika Ojakangas, faculty member of the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, “Eremos Aporos as the Paradigmatic Figure of Western (Thanato) Political Subject,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, August 4, 2013, vol. 38, iss. 194

\*\*\*gendered language not endorsed

One is now of course tempted to ask, what is the experience of contradiction in the sphere of morality? In the tradition of the West, this experience has been called the experience of bad conscience, guilt, shame, disgrace, and so on, but perhaps more important than any of these terms, denoting usually one aspect of the wholesale phenomenon, is the essence of this fundamental experience—the experience the Greeks identified with synoida emautó (“knowing with oneself”). Synoida emautõ is a verbal construction at the etymological root of the Greek conscience (syneidesis), which in classical Greek could have a neutral meaning, signifying that one is conscious of something concerning oneself but which could involve a moral meaning as well. Common to all these ethical uses of synoida emautõ is that it expresses a proJò taid sense of disorientation—a personal, moral, political, and religious sense of loss.’2 It is this experience of disorientation originating in the experience of conscience that constitutes the essence of Socratic politics. Recall Socrates’ words in Ilippias Major (304c) I quoted above, “It seems to me that some divine fortune (daimonia tis tykhe) holds me back. I am always wandering (planaö) and perplexed (aporö).” We also remember why he is aporos, meaning “helpless,” “without passage,” and “without orientation.” He is aporos because the “relative” living in his place constantly accuses him and puts him into shame no matter what he has done. In other words, especially if we interpret, with Arendt, the “relative” as a metaphor for conscience, the Socratic conscience is not a source of opinion, not even of normativity, but first and foremost the source of aporia. The conscience does not tell Socrates what to do and what to avoid but merely disturbs him up to the point of absolute confusion (“when you’re in a state like that, do you think it’s any better for you to live than die?”). In the same passage, however, Socrates also states that it is necessary to endure all this, because he thinks that it is good for him, and it is good to him because he believes that absolute disorientation is the necessary condition of true morality and politics. Only the one who, by virtue of humiliation, “knows with himself’ that he knows nothing is capable of leading virtuous life: “I know with myself (synoida emautõ) that I am not wise at all” (Apology 21b). This was a new formula of ethics and politics in the tradition of the West. The way to true moral and political knowledge goes through the absolute disorientation in terms of such knowledge. All the known truths have to be relativized in the confusing experience of conscience because there is no true virtue without absolute moral and political disorientation. This is also the backdrop of Socrates’ famous “method” of elenchus. We may translate elenchus as “cross-examination,” but given the fact that the word derives from the verb elengkhõ signifying “to reprove,” “to disgrace,” “to shame,” and “to accuse,” a more illustrative translation would be humiliation. In fact, it is precisely the verb elengkhõ Socrates employs in llippias Major (403d) when he laments that his “relative” is always disgracing him: “I hear every insult from that man ( ... ) who has always been disgracing (elengkhõ) me.” Hence, the “relative” employs the same method of elenchus in the case of Socrates as Socrates, the gadfly, employs when he “cross-examines” or more precisely, reproves and disgraces the Athenians: “I shall,” Socrates proclaims, “question and examine and disgrace (elengkhõ) everyone in Athens, young and old, citizens and foreigners” (Apology 29e—30a), continuing that “I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day long and everywhere I find myself in your company” (Apology 30e). In Theaitetos, Socrates likewise proclainis, “I am a most eccentric person (atopos) and drive men to aporia (poiotous anthropous aporein)” (Theaitetos 149a), adding that “those who associate with me (...) are in pain and (...) perplexed (aporia) night and day” (Theaitetos 151a). And, if we are to believe Plato, he was sometimes quite successful. Even Alcibiades, the proudest of the young Athenians, felt ashamed before Socrates, the self-appointed “conscience” of the Athenians: Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you didn’t think I had it in me, did you? Yes, he makes me feel ashamed, because I know with myself (synodia emautõ) that I can’t prove he’s wrong when he tells me what I should do: yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd. My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I’m doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should. Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were dead. (Symposium, 216b—c)It is sometimes complained that Plato’s Socratic dialogues are aporetic and do not lead to any conclusion, but, in truth, the only aim of such a “method” is aporia. In other words, the aim of the “method” of elenchus based on the accusations Socrates makes on his interlocutors is not to figure out what virtue means but, on the contrary, to reveal that all our conceptions of virtue are worth nothing and, ultimately, to elicit absolute disorientation in terms of morality and politics. The Socratic “method” of elenchus does not lead anywhere, or better still, it leads to nowhere. This is not a sign of the method’s failure, because it is the aporia that was sought for in the first place.’3 It was sought for, because Socrates believes that true moral and political knowledge can emanate from such an aporia alone. Only the one who, by virtue of disgrace and humiliation, knows with himself (synoida emautõ) that he knows nothing, to whom the world as a whole has become impenetrable, is capable of virtue. As Socrates proclaims in Philebus (16b), “There certainly is no better road (hodos), nor can there ever be, than that which I have always loved, though it has often deserted me, leaving me lonely and forlorn (ermon kai aporon).”

### Allied Coop

Drones policy is shrouded in secrecy – judicial oversight is impossible because of the lack of transparency – instead of assessing the information selectively leaked by the government, focus should be on the production of knowledge behind policy.

Toth 13, [Kate Toth, London School of Economics, Dissertation; “REMOTE-CONTROLLED WAR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTANCING OF STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY”; Apr 27, 2013; http://www.academia.edu/3125323/REMOTE-CONTROLLED\_WAR\_IMPLICATIONS\_OF\_THE\_DISTANCING\_OF\_STATE-SPONSORED\_VIOLENCE\_ON\_AMERICAN\_DEMOCRACY]

With regard to drones, what the public knows has been released through leaks to the press that were likely approved by the President (Engelhardt, 2012). Though the government now claims the right to assassinate Americans along with foreigners through the drone program, “informed public debate and judicial oversight” are impossible because “its drone program is so secret [the government] can't even admit to its existence” (Freed Wessler, 2012). That is, except via leaks that allow Obama to craft a politically advantageous narrative (Friedersdorf, 2012a). Meanwhile, the use of drones has exploded domestically, and again, “citizens lack a basic right to know who is operating the drones circling their houses, what information is being collected and how it will be used” (ABC News, 2012). The Bush administration politicized science (Beck, 1992) by notoriously editing reports on climate change and pressuring scientists (Coglianese, 2009). This is instructive for the current debate as it exhibits that one cannot simply assess the information released, but examine this knowledge within a political context, harking back to Foucault’s (1997) production of knowledge. Writing about the covert drone strikes, Friedersdorf (2012b) in The Atlantic asked, “in what sense would we be living in a representative democracy if neither the bulk of Congress nor the people” are told about the strikes? One of the lingering questions raised from this debate is, how different is it if we were told the bare minimum of facts via leaks, so still preventing effective debate, versus being told nothing at all? When President Obama took office, in the memo outlining his “Transparency and Open Government” initiative, it was written that transparency will “ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” and that this transparency will “strengthen our democracy” (White House, 2009). This is what Obama believes transparency has the power to achieve, and it falls in line with the access to information that Diamond and Morlino (2004) highlight as key to accountability in democracy. President Obama’s track record is, perhaps, an example of not striking the right balance between what, and how much, to release. However, given that many of the steps he has taken, both in terms of transparency of existing programs and secrecy regarding proliferation of new programs such as drones, it does not seem likely that this is unintentional. Transparency relies on a strong civil society to use the information effectively, or press for it to be released (Etzioni, 2010); perhaps this lack of accountability is also indicative of the weakness of current American civil society and media.

Court precedent proves that policy restrictions are doomed to failure – the secret behind the secret can never be disclosed to the judiciary – this card alone means they have no aff.

Ruppert, ’13 [Madison Ruppert, Editor of End the Lie, citing decision by Justice Colleen McMahon of the United States District Court, Southern District Of New York; “Federal judge: Obama admin never has to explain legal basis for drone assassinations of Americans”; Jan 2, 2013; ; http://endthelie.com/2013/01/02/federal-judge-obama-admin-never-has-to-explain-legal-basis-for-drone-assassinations-of-americans/#axzz2fZyjG3bL]

The paradoxical situation of the ruling was put well by David Kravets who writes McMahon is “allowing the administration to claim it was legal to kill enemies outside traditional combat zones while keeping the legal rational secret.” Indeed, McMahon confirmed that “the government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States.” “The Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me,” McMahon continued, “but after careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules — a veritable catch-22.” “I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret,” ruled McMahon. However, both the ACLU and The New York Times are not giving up after the defeat. “We began this litigation because we believed our readers deserved to know more about the U.S. government’s legal position on the use of targeted killings against persons having ties to terrorism, including U.S. citizens,” said David McCraw in The Times. “Judge McMahon’s decision speaks eloquently and at length to the serious legal questions raised by the targeted-killing program and to why in a democracy the government should be addressing those questions openly and fully,” said McCraw. Yet obviously McMahon’s decision fell far short of the mark in that it didn’t actually hold the Obama administration responsible for their actions. “This ruling denies the public access to crucial information about the government’s extrajudicial killing of U.S. citizens and also effectively greenlights its practice of making selective and self-serving disclosures,” said Jameel Jaffer, an ACLU lawyer. Indeed even McMahon noted that the Obama administration’s public state8ments on the program were “cryptic and imprecise,” although she used this to claim that they “were thus insufficient to overcome exemptions in the freedom of information law for classified materials and internal government deliberations,” according to The Times. Interestingly, McMahon admitted she had not even read the withheld documents and instead opted to claim that the memorandum prepared by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel must contain detailed analysis “unless the standards at O.L.C. have slipped dramatically.” The only information available on the memo comes from secondary sources who had allegedly read it, as reported by The Times. In other words, we have no clue what it really says and McMahon does not either. “More fulsome disclosure of the legal reasoning on which the administration relies to justify the targeted killing of individuals, including United States citizens, far from any recognizable ‘hot’ field of battle, would allow for intelligent discussion and assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it) remains hotly debated,” wrote McMahon. Reuters reports that McMahon “appeared reluctant to rule as she did,” although that isn’t quite evident from the ruling. In an attempt to show that McMahon was “reluctant” Reuters points to her writing that disclosure of the actual legal justification would help the American people understand the “vast and seemingly ever-growing exercise in which we have been engaged for well over a decade, at great cost in lives, treasure, and (at least in the minds of some) personal liberty.” In February of 2012 I wrote of the lawsuit, “Hopefully the ACLU will be able to make some progress with this lawsuit, but I seriously doubt anything will happen given the fact that the courts have become a tool of the executive and the entire system of checks and balances has been all but openly eradicated from the American political system entirely.” Unfortunately it seems I was right.

Their representations of NATO establishes a uniform Western identity in the face of fragmenting and liminal identities on the margins of order – these groups must be sublimated or violently eliminated for their strategy to succeed

Klein 90, PhD from Harvard, International Studies Quarterly (1990) 34

Re-Presenting NATO The strategic/security enterprise is engaged in a politics of representation which helps constitute and delimit the identities of various peoples (Shapiro, 1988). Strate­gic studies celebrates the processes of modernity by reifying cultural construction into a completed historical act, enshrined as Western culture. But it is possible to acknowledge or recognize alternative ways of life within that Western space (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 1988). The exercise is a reminder of what, ethnographi-cally speaking, the strategic equation excludes. For the ultimate question forestajled by modern Western strategy has been the one who or what "we" in "the West" are. In other words, the politics of strategy has to do with selecting this or that particular account of human life as dominant. Numerous forms of life are ruled out of the picture as inconsistent with the cultural claims of a singular, modern, progressive industrial order. There are many candidates for that liminal space which escapes Western "identity": Gypsies in Great Britain, those "Traveler" peoples whose cara­vans represent the last vestiges of freeholders dispossessed by enclosure movements; Balkan guest workers in West German cities, who are not eligible for service in the Bundeswehr but who occupy the kind of marginal work stations now deemed unac­ceptable by modern Europeans; Lapp reindeer herders, whose presence in the up­per reaches of Scandinavia hardly seems a contribution to NATO's Northern Flank; Native Indians in the Canadian Northwest, who now share space with the surveil­lance installations of NORAD; and the former colonial peoples of the British Empire now seeking refuge in the core. A whole series of marginal categorizations and boundaries could be enumerated, and they need not be limited to the ethnographic. Fractures of class, gender, and race—of partisan politics and religious identity—all demark potential sites of contestation within the Western Alliance. Yet these are unacknowledged, except as internal threats to the unit and "identity" of the West. NATO's representations of modern geopolitical space presuppose an unproblem-atic singular human identity which all members of the West either embody or aspire towards. This is, after all, what is worth dying for or, in the modern age of deter­rence, worth voting monies for in order to "secure." The classical strategic tradition has always enshrined this singular Western space as beyond politics. Those who would disturb it tamper with "order" and Western "stability."This is why oppositional peace groups in the last decade or two have remained so ephemeral in the West (Herf, 1986). Their critiques of military-technical strategy underplay the broader parameters of the life secured by deterrence strategies and modern weapons systems (Walker, 1984). Thus Western strategists find a greater reserve of support through emphasizing these cultural dimensions of Western policy than through emphasizing the latest round of measures to ensure security against threats from the East. Besides, in the Gorbachev era the invocation of such threats will ring hollow. In the absence of an overwhelmingly plausible sign of danger, there are grounds for exploiting certain political breaches that have recently opened up in NATO. Reading NATO documents and debates today leaves one with the unmistakable impression that the basic problem facing the alliance is the absence of a plausible threat to Western military security (Head, 1989). It turns out that Gorbachev poses the greatest challenge of all to NATO because he refuses to participate in the requi­site duplication of the Cold War intertext (Joenniemi, 1989)—something that Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev were too unimaginative to contemplate. Even if Stalin's armies weren't large enough to roll over the West, NATO drew upon the existence of the Soviet's counter-offensive wartime strategy to justify its own existence (Hollo-way, 1984, 1988/89; Snyder, 1987/88). 319-320

### PQD

Maintaining hegemony accelerates paranoid imperial violence – Their paranoid mythologizing sanitizes imperial domination and erupts into pyrotechnic violence – fear causes cycles of enemy construction, making their impacts inevitable.

McClintock 9 (Anne, Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,”[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f4) and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. [End Page 51] I have come to feel that we urgently need to make apparent [sic] (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f5) Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself unnoticeable [sic], casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on conceiving [sic] the violence that the imperial state attempts to render unnoticeable [sic], while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f6) Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. [End Page 52] Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f7) Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence.[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f8) Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.”[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f9) Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence**,** and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. [End Page 53] Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

Climate change is not anthropocentric and isn’t just the extinction of humanity—climate change is a product of white culture and means the extinction of minorities—their neutral representations of climate make warming inevitable

Wynter 07, [2007, Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf]

For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

#### Internationalization of U.S. law spurs interventions and coopts international bodies causing mass war and suffering

Martinot 03 [2003, Steve, lecturer at San Francisco State University in the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs, “The Cultural Roots of Interventionism in the US,” Social Justice Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 19-20]

"Internationalization" of U.S. law was extended further by the 1991 bombing of Iraq, and later by the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia. In those cases, the person named criminal had not violated U.S. law. Nevertheless, the U.S. government chose to proclaim a violation. Saddam Hussein was charged with aggression against Kuwait, though the reality of what had transpired between the two countries was left unspoken.(FN8) Slobodan Milosevich was charged with human rights violations in his own country, though NATO's involvement in Serbian internal affairs was similarly swept out of sight.(FN9) The two interventions had similar goals: to force Iraq out of Kuwait and to force Serbia out of Kosovo. Both were manifested through inappropriate international bodies. In the first case, a U.N. peacekeeping organization was used to make war; in the second, NATO used an international treaty organization to resolve an internal matter in a non-signatory sovereign nation. The first occurred in total rejection of Iraq's willingness to negotiate its withdrawal from Kuwait (it had, in fact, negotiated its invasion of Kuwait with the U.S.); the second was promulgated through ultimatums designed to nullify Serbian sovereignty (that is, that Serbia negotiate the erasure of its existence as a negotiant).(FN10) Ultimately, Kuwait and Kosovo were seized and occupied militarily by the U.S. (or NATO) after enormously destructive technological assaults, as if that had been the goal all along. In effect, international bodies designed to preserve sovereignty and oversee international peace were transformed into war councils against national sovereignty, in violation of the United Nations Charter (Articles 2, 33, and 42). Coopted as proxies for U.S. policy, they were, in effect, "nationalized" by the U.S. for its own international purposes. Thus, their transformation is consistent with the earlier "precedent" of conflating U.S. and international law with respect to Panama. The idea of U.S. "nationalization" of international law implies the subordination of international law to U.S. policy.(FN11) The attack sequence (Panama, Iraq, Yugoslavia), in marking the unilateral usurpation of international law as an extension of U.S. jurisdiction to the international level, and subsuming it to U.S. policy, constitutes a massive rejection of respect for sovereignty or the possibility of "due process" with respect to sovereign nations. Rather, it substitutes the capabilities of power for the rule of law implied in D'Amato's theoretics, namely, that might makes right. In the process, the concept of war has been transformed, reflecting this transformation of international relations. It has become something other than war. Aerial bombing from vast distances of nations like Afghanistan or Yugoslavia, which are incapable of carrying on an air war, cannot be considered a war. When only one side does any shooting, it becomes something else, something beyond war. Despite having no real opposition, the bombing was carried out to full destructiveness. The conventional bomb ordnance dropped on Iraq in 1991 was the equivalent of six Hiroshima-sized A-bombs. Among the first targets were electric power stations, desalinization plants, and sewage treatment plants; that is, civilian infrastructure along with military targets (Clark, 1992). This, too, is not war; it is a form of "clearing the land"--Guernica on a national scale. Finally, even the concept of "costs" was inverted. The U.S. transformed itself from a creditor nation to the world's largest debtor nation during the Reagan years. Military action is infinitely more expensive than diplomacy or negotiations, both in a monetary sense, and in the lives and psychic damage to all concerned. Yet the massive violence, the displacement of people, the terrible wounds to bodies and social space wrought by bombing, was somehow preferable, as if conspicuous extravagance would offset the cost rather than augment it. In sum, the bombing itself appears to have been one of the real motivations for the assault. A massive ethical inversion lurks here in the disparity between a real war and wanton destruction.

### Imminence

Indo-pak war is a constructed concept to maintain static political identity through threat discourse.

Nizamani 2k (Haider Nizamani, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, 2k [The roots of rhetoric: politics of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, p. 11-12)

I conceptualize security discourses as a framework through which the constant articulation of external dangers is used to carve out and maintain a particular version of national identity for a state. Neither the sources of the danger nor the identity it supposedly threatens is static. The goal of negotiating and striking a delicate balance between the imagined community and the reality of existing heterogeneity often propels security discourses in such a manner that externalizing the danger to the imagined community becomes one common feature of security policies. Analyzing the discourse of security policies one would ask, “How, from the welter of information and interaction among states and their representatives, are threats constructed, and mobilised against?”52 Once understood in terms of discourse, the language employed by security analysts and policy-makers becomes more than an objective analysis or representation of a state’s national interest. Discourse analysts see such statements by decision-makers and analyses by experts as expressions of particular interests and justifiers of a distinct regime of practices or truth. As this discourse is conducted within the context of the respective societies, we have to keep in mind Foucault’s following observation: Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.53 The nuclear discourse in the subcontinent also has its “general politics of truth” in which certain types of statements are made to function as true and thus serve as informal rules by which some statements are designated as accurate reflections of national interests and others as antinational view-points. This general politics of truth sanctifies certain means of inquiry and dismisses others. This in turn creates the Pundits and Dalits (Untouchables) in the nukespeak hierarchy of the subcontinent. The question of truth is not isolated from issues of power and right. In the triangle of truth, power, and right Foucault observed a close relationship where ‘‘there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of association.”54 To put it simply, “we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”55 The discourse of truth is not a mere linguistic construction but an engine of power whose effects can be felt at different levels. As such it is through discourses of truth that we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, and destined to a certain mode of living or dying.56 An analysis of a regime of discourse, in this case the nuclear discourse in Pakistan and India, questions the objectivity of so-called self-evident truths regarding a subject matter by viewing them as products of specific historical circumstances and statements that are subject to manipulation. However, these discourses once in place have the capacity to manipulate participants in that area, as well as influence the shape of things to come there. Hence, it is a mutually constitutive process where both the agency and the structure shape and reshape each other. This mode of inquiry is suited to undertake projects aimed at writing histories of the present. It is the topical nature of nukespeak in the subcontinent that warrants accounting for its underlying rules, both formal and informal, that enable nukespeakers to prescribe the forms of thinking, writing, and policy-making possible on the issue. Such an effort is a history of the present because it tackles an issue that preoccupies the political agendas of contemporary Pakistan and India. Viewed as a discourse, politics of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and India can meaningfully be considered as political practices central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of their national identities by invoking the themes of threats and dangers.

## 2NC – K

### 2NC Alt

#### It’s a prior question to all political engagement – we must interrogate zones of in/distinction and how they are politically structured

Edkins 2k, Jenny Edkins, faculty member of the school of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indisitinction, and the Camp,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 25, Is. 3

\*\*\*Gendered language not endorsed

At the threshold of the modern era, then, the realm of bare life begins to coincide with the political, and inclusion and exclusion, outside and inside, bios and we, right and fact, enter into a zone of indistinction. In these zones of indistinction, bare life, or homo sacer, becomes both the subject and the object of the political order: it is both the place for the organization of state power, in the forms of discipline and objectification described by Foucault, and the place for emancipation from it, through the birth of modern democracy and the demand for human rights. This move of biological life to the center of the political scene in the West leads to a transformation of the political, realm itself, one that effectively constitutes its depoliticization. That depoliticization takes place side by side with the politicization of bare life. Bare life is politicized and political life disappears This irony is explained by the way the link forged in modernity between politics and bare life, a link that underpins ideologies from the right and the left, has been ignored. As Agamben says, “if politics today seems to be passing through a lasting eclipse, this is because politics has failed to reckon with this foundational event of modernity... Only a reflection that... interrogates the link between bare life and politics... will be able to bring the political out of its concealment.”0 Any attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with an awareness of the Impossibility of the classical distinction between private life and political existence and examine the zones of indistinction into which the oppositions that produced modern politics in the West—inside/outside, right/left; public/private—have dissolved. Agamben proposes that “it is on the basis of these uncertain and nameless terrains, these difficult zones of indistinction, that the ways and forms of a new politics must be thought.”’ in the zone of indistinction, a claim to a politically qualified life can no longer be effective as such. Alexis de Tocqueville’s liberal writing on democracy is exemplary of a political philosophy where the separations between ‘we, in the form of natural life or kindred, and bios, the subject of citizenship, are unquestioned.2 As Michael Shapiro shows, this leads to a strategic blindness to the political in family and domestic relationships in de Tocqucville’s discussion of America. It is only if we resist this conceptual tendency that we are able “to recognize that black habitation, for example, the social uses of the home, neighborhood and city, is a form of political action.” Shapiro explores the way in which in literary texts and in film, liberalism’s attempt to ignore the life of the oikos—in this case, the African American oikos—is challenged, and the zone of indistinction between politics and the domestic in which sovereignty functions revealed. Liberal theorizing continues to regard black (and Native American) life as a matter of ethnic, not political, relations: this life is the bare life of the slave or the native, not politically qualified life, which is seen as a white phenomenon. This treatment enables liberals to justify continuing inequality by blaming on, for example, differing family structures. It is a social, not a political, problem. Shapiro argues that an extension of political recognition such as has occurred in the United States, where blacks, women, and Native Americans have become citizens, is not enough since “it represents an enlarged qualification without providing an appreciation of the violence of disqualification inherent in the institutional-juridical view of sovereignty.”24 He calls instead for a politics of equality and an end to disqualification: for a politics not based on the discrimination of different forms of life.

#### It’s the only way that we can break down militarism

Taylor, 9 (Diana, Professor of Performance Studies and Spanish @ NYU, “Afterword: War Play,” PMLA, October, p. 1886-1895)

And war seeps back into aesthetic frameworks.Avant-gardeis originally a militaryterm, meaning the advanced guard of anarmy. Rendition referred to surrender beforeit meant performance. Now renditionis synonymous with dark sites and criminalwarfare. The blurring of boundaries betweenmilitarism and play, and between scenariosand the real, allows the performance ofpower to reach very different audiences. Themedia ensure that militarism reaches theirown theater of operations—public opinion.Counterinsurgency, the 2006 field manual(FM3-24) put out by the United States Army and Marine Corps, makes it clear in the firstparagraph of the introduction: enemies of the United States cannot confront its military with conventional weapons; the military is too powerful. So “they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating suchenemies presents a huge challenge” (ix). The “decisive battle,” as one commentator put it,“may take place, not in the streets of Baghdad, but in the living rooms of America.”11 We, the imagined audience, are the target; our resolve is the weak link.12

### 2NC Framework

#### 3. Fiat is not real – knowledge production in the United States has been filtered to foster militarism and imperialism without question – interrogation of our rhetoric and justification of political action is the only way that we can engage in meaningful politics

Shor, 10 - Wayne State history professor

[Francis, Dying Empire: US Imperialism and Global Resistance, p32-34, net library, accessed 1-31-10]

In order to excavate and explode the mental landscapes created by imperial enclosures, we will need to confront and transcend the blinkered intelligence, impeded wills, and hectored hearts that are integral to the imperial and civic enclosures that surround us in the United States. These enclosures are enerated by ideological mechanisms, media constructions, and daily social practices that are deeply embedded in the political culture of an imperial U.S. From uncritical patriotism, induced by ruling elites and ritualized by the corporate media, to cultural provincialism, U.S. citizens are ensconced in an imperial matrix that distorts reality and nurtures "aggressive militarism" and 'escalating authoritarianism." "As the militarization of American society proceeds," contends Carl Boggs, "the confluence of the domestic war economy and global Empire generates popular attitudes inconsistent with a vibrant, democratic public sphere: fear hatred, jingoism, racism, and aggression. We have arrived at a bizarre mixture of imperial arrogance and collective paranoia, violent impulses and a retreat from the norms of civic engagement and obligation that patriotic energies furnish only falsely and ephemerally." Recognizing how falsely and ephemerally patriotism attempts to assuage the assaults of militarism and imperialism, a number of feminist dissenters have promoted "matriotism" as a key component of critical opposition. Among the more prominent proponents of matriotism was Cindy Sheehan, the anti-war advocate who became a lightning rod for opponents of the Iraq War after her son, Casey, was killed in Iraq. Writing in January 2006, Sheehan argued that a "true Matriot would never drop an atomic bomb or bombs filled with white phosphorous, carpet bomb cities, and villages, or control drones from thousands of miles away to kill innocent men, women and children." Beyond this critique of war-making, Sheehan urged those among her readers who would join other matriots "to stand up and say: "No, I’m not giving my child to the fake patriotism of the war machine which chews up my flesh and blood to spit out obscene profits." While flag-wavering patriotism may provide ideological cover for the mendacity of ruling elites and compensatory status for the powerless, it also reinforces the self-enclosure of imperialism. The desperate need to display the flag, from the phalanxes of those that now accompany the public appearances of U.S. presidents to the periodic fluttering outside the homes of average citizens, provides a symbolic ritual for imperial legitimacy. In effect, the more uncritical the kind of patriotism that rules popular imagination and public discourse, the more alone, insulated, special and different the American ethos makes people feel. The more it holds up a distorting mirror to itself and the rest of the world, the more incomprehensible the rest of the world becomes, full of inarticulate, hostile elements. That distorting mirror is not only part of the imperial narrative that represents the United States as the repository of good in the world, but is also a function of the role of corporate media's presentation of the world. Through the use of framing and filtering devices, U.S. corporate media, especially television, manage to narrow and exclude critical perspectives, leading to significant misperceptions. In fact, according to a University of Massachusetts study of television viewers during Operation Desert Storm in 1991: "the more TV people watched, the less they knew....Despite months of coverage, most people do not know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East, or about the recent history of U.S. policy towards Iraq" Added to media distortions, misrepresentations, and complicity, the Bush Administration's deliberate policy of disinformation in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003 further eroded the public's critical understanding of the situation in the Middle East and Iraq. Erroneously insisting on ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the Bush Administration and complicit corporate media helped to frame the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Such misperceptions persisted into 2006 when a Harris Poll found that 64 percent still believed that Hussein had strong links to al Qaeda and 50 percent were convinced that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the U.S. invaded. The kind of disinformation spread by politicians and pundits and reinforced by the media follows from our national and imperial myths which, in turn, bother literally and figuratively separate us from the rest of the world. While not a new phenomenon, such imperial self-enclosure does seem even more striking in the globalized and interconnected world we now inhabit. "As the American media has acquired a global reach," argue cultural critics Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, "it has simultaneously, and paradoxically, become even more parochial and banal." According to Sardar and Davies, the media reinforce what they call "knowledgeable ignorance" by acting as "the gatekeeper of what is relevant and necessary to know about Third World civilizations." Often, most evident in those mediage images are ones of random violence or poverty and disease unrelated to U.S. policies. However, it is not just those countries caught up in conflict, whether initiated by the United States or endemic to a particular region, that suffer from media frames that diminish or denigrate the reality of others' lives. "As a function of American narcissism," notes another critic, "American media tend to problematize all countries except the United States....The absence of self-reflexivity or a sense of humor and irony in viewing America's place in the world seems to be part of the collective habitus." Even when U.S. citizens are aware of some vague relationship between their government and conditions elsewhere, there remains a kind of phenomenological disconnection, inherent in life in an imperial culture, which impedes understanding of the causal connections. Commenting on the violations perpetrated against peasants in central America by U.S. sponsored militaries and para-militaries and the resultant gross violations of human rights, Christian Smith observes: "Most Americans probably were, in fact, concerned about these problems. But for most U.S. citizens, these injustices and atrocities remained essentially abstract and remote, detached from the immediate affairs that shaped their lives. It is not that most Americans were necessarily callous. They simply lacked the cultural and social positioning that would have infused these violations with a sense of personal immediacy and urgency. The lack of a cultural and social positioning is evident in the way some U.S. citizens continue to see the world through the same blinkered filters that inform the dynamics of knowledgeable ignorance. A good example of the misperception of the U.S. role in the world is how the vast majority of U.S. citizens continue to overestimate the largesse of their government's foreign aid. Although most citizens believe the U.S. gives close to 10 percent of its GDP for foreign aid, the U.S. actually gives closer to 0.1 percent. Moreover, much of that aid is military material sent to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. A fictional example, albeit representative, of such knowledgeable ignorance or imperial arrogance while abroad is the evangelical Baptist father in Barbara Kingsolver's 1998 novel, The Poisonwood Bible. Nathan Price stubbornly insists that every last bit of U.S. culture and horticulture can be easily transplanted in the Congo in the midst of the Cold War. With such imperial blinders and blinkered intelligence he manages to endanger his whole family, resulting in the death of one child and his own demise.

#### 4. Attempts to combine activism with policy deliberation kills the potential to create any change, the activism will always be co-opted and incorporated into current strategies of dominance employed within the public.

Young, 1 (Iris Marion, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 670-690)

Let us suppose that by some combination of activist agitation and deliber- ative persuasion, some deliberative settings emerge that approximately rep- resent all those affected by the outcome of certain policy decisions. Given the world of structural inequality as we know it, the activist believes such a cir- cumstance will be rare at best but is willing to entertain the possibility for the sake of this argument. The activist remains suspicious of the deliberative democrat's exhortation to engage in reasoned and critical discussion with people he disagrees with, even on the supposition that the public where he engages in such discussion really includes the diversity of interests and per- spectives potentially affected by policies. That is because he perceives that existing social and economic structures have set unacceptable constraints on the terms of deliberation and its agenda. Problems and disagreements in the real world of democratic politics appear and are addressed against the background of a given history and sedi- mentation of unjust structural inequality, says the activist, which helps set agenda priorities and constrains the alternatives that political actors may con- sider in their deliberations. When this is so, both the deliberative agenda and the institutional constraints it mirrors should themselves be subject to criti- cism, protest, and resistance.7 Going to the table to meet with representatives of those interests typically served by existing institutional relations, to discuss how to deal most justly with issues that presuppose those institutional rela- tions, gives both those institutions and deliberative process too much legiti- macy. It co-opts the energy of citizens committed to justice, leaving little time for mobilizing people to bash the institutional constraints and decision- making process from the outside. Thus, the responsible citizen ought to with- draw from implicit acceptance of structural and institutional constraints by refusing to deliberate about policies within them. Let me give some examples. A local anti-poverty advocacy group engaged in many forms of agitation and protest in the years leading up to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act by the U.S. Congress in the spring of 1996. This legislation fundamentally changed the terms of welfare policy in the United States. It abolished entitlements to public assistance for the first time in sixty years, allowing states to deny benefits when funds have run out. It requires recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to work at jobs after a certain period and allows states to vary significantly in their pro- grams. Since passage of the legislation, the anti-poverty advocacy group has organized recipients and others who care about welfare justice to protest and lobby the state house to increase welfare funding and to count serving as a welfare rights advocate in local welfare offices as a "work activity."

#### 5. The affirmatives faith in the legal system is misplaced. They posit a static form of legality that violently aims to order and control socio-economicly identified populations without accepting inherent difference – no way to form intersections that solve difference and coalitions.

Gordon 87, Robert Gordon, Professor of Law at Stanford, “Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law,” Florida State University Law Review, Vol 15 No 3. 1987, lexis

Now a central tenet of CLS work has been that the ordinary discourses of law -- debates over legislation, legal arguments, administrative and court decisions, lawyers' discussions with clients, legal commentary and scholarship, etc. -- all contribute to cementing this feeling, at once despairing and complacent, that things must be the way they are and that major changes could only make them worse. Legal discourse accomplishes this in many ways. First by endlessly repeating the claim that law and the other policy sciences have perfected a set of rational techniques and institutions that have come about as close as we are ever likely to get to solving the problem of domination in civil society. Put another way, legal discourse paints an idealized fantasy of order according to which legal rules and procedures have so structured relations among people that such relations may primarily be understood as instituted by their consent, their free and rational choices. Such coercion as apparently remains may be explained as the result of necessity -- either natural necessities (such as scarcity or the limited human capacity for altruism) or social necessities. For example, in a number of the prevailing discourses, the ordinary hierarchies of workplace domination and subordination are explained: (1) by reference to the contractual agreement of the parties and to their relative preferences for responsibility versus leisure, or risk taking versus security; (2) by the natural distribution of differential talents and skills (Larry Bird earns more as a basketball player because he is better); and (3) by the demands of efficiency in production, which are said to require extensive hierarchy for the purposes of supervision and monitoring, centralization of investment decisions, and so forth. There are always some residues of clearly unhappy [\*199] conditions -- undeserved deprivation, exploitation, suffering -- that cannot be explained in any of these ways. The discourses of law are perhaps most resourceful in dealing with these residues, treating them as, on the whole, readily reformable within the prevailing political options for adjusting the structures of ordinary practices -- one need merely fine tune the scheme of regulation, or deregulation, to correct them. But the prevailing discourse has its cynical and worldly side, and its tragic moments, to offset the general mood of complacency. In this mood it resignedly acknowledges that beyond the necessary minimum and the reformable residues of coercion and misery there is an irreducible, intractable remainder -- due to inherent limits on our capacity for achieving social knowledge, or for changing society through deliberate intervention, or for taking collective action against evil without suffering the greater evil of despotic power. These discourses of legal and technical rationality, of rights, consent, necessity, efficiency, and tragic limitation, are of course discourses of power -- not only for the obvious reasons that law's commands are backed by force and its operations can inflict enormous pain, but because to have access to these discourses, to be able to use them or pay others to use them on your behalf, is a large part of what it means to possess power. Further, they are discourses that -- although often partially constructed, or extracted as concessions, through the pressure of relatively less powerful groups struggling from below -- in habitual practice tend to express the interests and the perspectives of the powerful people who use them. The discourses have some of the power they do because some of their claims sound very plausible, though many do not. The claim, for example, that workers in health-destroying factories voluntarily "choose," in any practical sense of the term, the risks of the workplace in return for a wage premium, is probably not believed by anyone save those few expensively trained out of the capacity to recognize what is going on around them. In addition, both the plausible and implausible claims are backed up in the cases of law and of economics and the policy sciences by a quite formidable-seeming technocratic apparatus of rational justification -- suggesting that the miscellany of social practices we happen to have been born into in this historical moment is much more than a contingent miscellany. It has an order, even if sometimes an invisible one; it makes sense. The array of legal norms, institutions, procedures, and doctrines in force, can be rationally derived from the principles of regard for individual autonomy, utilitarian [\*200] efficiency or wealth creation, the functional needs of social order or economic prosperity, or the moral consensus and historical traditions of the community. There are several general points CLS people have wanted to assert against these discourses of power. First, the discourses have helped to structure our ordinary perceptions of reality so as to systematically exclude or repress alternative visions of social life, both as it is and as it might be. One of the aims of CLS methods is to try to dredge up and give content to these suppressed alternative visions. Second, the discourses fail even on their own terms to sustain the case for their relentlessly apologetic conclusions. Carefully understood, they could all just as well be invoked to support a politics of social transformation instead. n3 Generally speaking, the CLS claims under this heading are that the rationalizing criteria appealed to (of autonomy, functional utility, efficiency, history, etc.) are far too indeterminate to justify any conclusions about the inevitability or desirability of particular current practices; such claims, when unpacked, again and again turn out to rest on some illegitimate rhetorical move or dubious intermediate premise or empirical assumption. Further, the categories, abstractions, conventional rhetorics, reasoning modes and empirical statements of our ordinary discourses in any case so often misdescribe social experience as not to present any defensible pictures of the practices that they attempt to justify. Not to say of course that there could be such a thing as a single correct way of truthfully rendering social life as people live it, or that CLS writers could claim to have discovered it. But the commonplace legal discourses often produce such seriously distorted representations of social life that their categories regularly filter out complexity, variety, irrationality, unpredictability, disorder, cruelty, coercion, violence, suffering, solidarity and self-sacrifice. n4 [\*201] Summing up: The purpose of CLS as an intellectual enterprise is to try to thaw out, or at least to hammer some tiny dents on, the frozen mind sets induced by habitual exposure to legal practices -- by trying to show how normal legal discourses contribute to freezing, and to demonstrate how problematic these discourses are.

### Fasching

#### This debate is about competing methodologies. The 1AC chooses to footnote their own agency and call on the USFG to take action. This is the same logic that caused fascism to rise to power and it is the same logic that maintains militarism. Their presentation and political practice is one that forecloses any larger discussion of ethics and political agency that will recreate totalitarian violence.

Fasching and DeChant 01, (Darrell and Dell, Prof. of Religious Studies @ University of South Florida, Prof. of Religious Studies @ USF, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, Pg.  42-43)

Interpreting our own historical situation is a risky business, for we are still too close to the events. We do not have the distance needed to put everything into proper perspective. Nevertheless, without such an interpretation it is impossible to identify the ethical challenges that face us, so we must risk it. In this chapter we argue that two major trends unfolded in the twentieth century that are of significance for thinking about ethics: (1) the phenomenon of mass killing encouraged by sacred narratives that authorize "killing in order to heal," as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and (2) a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of non-violent resistance or civil disobedience symbolized by figures like Gandhi and King – one that functions as an ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger. The second, we suggest, offers an ethic of the holy in response to the sacred morality of the first. The modern period, which began with a utopian hope that science and technology would create an age of peace, prosperity, and progress,ended in an apocalyptic nightmare of mass death, symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, leaving us with the task of creating a post/modern ethic that can transcend the techno-bureaucratic tribalism that expressed itself in two world wars. Technobureaucratic tribalism occurs when sacred narratives are combined with the technical capacity to produce mass death. While we do not pretend to offer an exhaustive explanation of the modern propensity for mass death, we do suggest two key elements: (1) the use of sacred narratives that define killing as a form of healing, and (2) theundermining of ethical consciousness by techno-bureaucratic organization through a psychological process of doubling (separating one's personal and professional identities),which enables individuals to deny that they are responsible for some of their actions. Through sacred stories, the stranger is defined as less than human and therefore beyond the pale of ethical obligation, as well as a threat to sacred order. At the same time, bureaucracies encourage one to engage in a total surrender of self in unquestioning obedience to higher (sacred) authority(whether God, religious leaders, or political leaders), so that when one acts as a professional self on behalf of an institution (the state, the military, the church, etc.) one can say, "It is not I that acts: a higher authority is acting through me, so I am not personally responsible." Yet, despite the seemingly overwhelming dominance of techno- bureaucratic tribalism and mass killing in the twentieth century, a modest but important counter-trend also emerged – a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger, linked to such names as Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King. The purpose of this chapter is to grasp the ethical challenge of modernity as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The purpose of the remainder of this book is to examine the potential of the ethical response to that challenge offered by the tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, symbolized by Gandhi and King, for a cross-cultural and interreligious post/modern ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation.

### A2 Legalism/Reform Good

#### Legalism DA

Ugo Mattei 3, Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, U.C. Hastings; Professore Ordinario di Diritto Civile, Università di Torino A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/pol160A/Mattei.pdf

This essay attempts to develop a theory of imperial law that is able to explain postCold War changes in the general process of Americanization in legal thinking. My claim is that “imperial law” is now a dominant layer of world-wide legal systems.1 Imperial law is produced, in the interest of international capital, by a variety of both public and private institutions, all sharing a gap in legitimacy, sometimes called the “democratic deficit.” Imperial law is shaped by a spectacular process of exaggeration, aimed at building consent for the purpose of hegemonic domination. Imperial law subordinates local legal arrangements world-wide, reproducing on the global scale the same phenomenon of legal dualism that thus far has characterized the law of developing countries. Predatory economic globalization is the vehicle, the all-mighty ally, and the beneficiary of imperial law. Ironically, despite its absolute lack of democratic legitimacy, imperial law imposes as a natural necessity, by means of discursive practices branded “democracy and the rule of law,” a reactive legal philosophy that outlaws redistribution of wealth based on social solidarity.2 At the core of imperial law there is U.S. law, as transformed and adapted after the Reagan-Thatcher revolution, in the process of infiltrating the huge periphery left open after the end of the Cold War. A study of imperial law requires a careful discussion of the factors of penetration of U.S. legal consciousness world-wide, as well as a careful distinction between the context of production and the context of reception3 of the variety of institutional arrangements that make imperial law. Factors of resistance need to be fully appreciated as well.¶ I. AMERICAN LAW: FROM LEADERSHIP TO DOMINANCE The years following the Second World War have shown a dramatic change in the pattern of world hegemony in the law. Leading legal ideas, once produced in Continental Civilian Europe and exported through the periphery of the world, are now for the first time produced in a common law jurisdiction: the United States.4 There is little question that the present world dominance of the United States has been economic, military, and political first, and legal only in a more recent moment, so that a ready explanation of legal hegemony can be found with a simple Marxist explanation of law as a superstructure of the economy.5 Nevertheless, the question of the relationship between legal, political, and economic hegemony is not likely to be correctly addressed within a cause-and-effect paradigm.6 Ultimately, addressing this question is a very important area of basic jurisprudential research because it reveals some general aspects about the nature of law as a device of global governance.¶ Observing historical patterns of legal hegemony allows us to critique the distinction between two main patterns of governance through the law (and of legal transplants).7 Scholars of legal transplants have traditionally distinguished two patterns. The first is law as dominance without hegemony, in which the legal system is ultimately a coercive apparatus asserting political and economic power without consent. This area of inquiry and this model have been used to explain the relationship between the legal system of the motherland and that of the colonies within imperialistic colonial enterprises. The opposing pattern, telling a story of consensual voluntary reception by an admiring periphery of legal models developed and provided for at the center, is usually considered the most important pattern of legal transplants. It is described by stressing on the idea of consent within a notion of “prestige.”8¶ Little effort is necessary to challenge the sufficiency of this basic taxonomy in introducing legal transplants. Law is a detailed and complex machinery of social control that cannot function with any degree of effectiveness without some cooperation from a variety of individuals staffing legal institutions. These individuals usually consist of a professional elite which either already exists or is created by the hegemonic power. Such an elite provides the degree of consent to the reception of foreign legal ideas that is necessary for any legal transplant to occur. Hence, the distinction between imperialistic and non-imperialistic transplants is a matter only of degree and not of structure. In order to understand the nature of present legal hegemony, it is necessary to capture the way in which the law functions to build a degree of consent to the present pattern of international economic and political dominance.9¶ In this essay I suggest that a fundamental cultural construct of presumed consent is the rhetoric of democracy and the rule of law utilized by the imperial model of governance, 10 triumphant worldwide together with the neo-American model of capitalism developed by the Reagan and Thatcher revolution early in the 1980s. I argue that the last twenty years have produced the triumph in global governance of reactive, politically irresponsible institutions, such as the courts of law, over proactive politically accountable institutions such as direct administrative apparatuses of the State.11¶ This essay attempts to open a radical revision of some accepted modes of thought about the law as they appear today, at what has been called “the end of history.”12 Its aim is to discuss some ways in which global legality has been created in the present stage of world-wide legal development. It will show how democracy and the rule of law, in the present legal landscape, are just another rhetoric of legitimization of a given international dynamic of power. It will also denounce the present unconscious state in which the law is produced and developed by professional “consent building” elites. The consequences of such unconsciousness are creating a legal landscape in which the law is “naturally” giving up its role of constraining opportunistic behavior of market actors. This process results in the development of faked rules and institutions that are functional to the interests of the great capital and that dramatically enlarge inequality within society. I predict that such a legal environment is unable to avoid tragic results on a global scale such as those outlined in the well-known parable of the tragedy of the commons.13¶ My object of observation is a legal landscape in transition. I wish to analyze this path of transition from one political setting (the local state) to another political setting (world governance) in which American-framed reactive institutions are asserting themselves as legitimate and legitimating governing bodies, which I call imperial law. Imperial law is the product of a renowned alliance between state and economic institutions, a cooperative game in which a very limited number of powerful players are at play.14 While in the ages of colonialism such political battles for international hegemony were mostly carried on with an open use of force and political violence (in such a way that final extensive conflict between superpowers was unavoidable), in the age of globalization and of economic Empire political violence has been transformed into legal violence.

#### No US anti-war movement can ever succeed unless we FOREGROUND and FUNDAMENTALLY grapple with the foundations of anti-blackness and anti-indigeneity – the negative is a PRE-REQUISITE before addressing any of the affirmative problems

Ford 12 (Glen, THE US EMPIRE’S ACHILLES HEEL: ITS BARBARIC RACISM, published by Black Agenda Report, March 17, 2012)

The American atrocities in Afghanistan roll on like a drumbeat from hell. With every affront to the human and national dignity of the Afghan people, the corporate media feign shock and quickly conclude that a few bad apples are responsible for U.S. crimes, that it’s all a mistake and misunderstanding, rather than the logical result of a larger crime: America’s attempt to dominate the world by force. But even so, with the highest paid and best trained military in the world – a force equipped with the weapons and communications gear to exercise the highest standards of control known to any military in history – one would think that commanders could keep their troops from making videos of urinating on dead men, or burning holy books, or letting loose homicidal maniacs on helpless villagers.¶ These three latest atrocities have brought the U.S. occupation the point of crisis – hopefully, a terminal one. But the whole war has been one atrocity after another, from the very beginning, when the high-tech superpower demonstrated the uncanny ability to track down and incinerate whole Afghan wedding parties – not just once, but repeatedly. Quite clearly, to the Americans, these people have never been more than ants on the ground, to be exterminated at will.¶ The Afghans, including those on the U.S. payroll, repeatedly use the word “disrespect” to describe American behavior. But honest people back here in the belly of the beast know that the more accurate term is racism. The United States cannot help but be a serial abuser of the rights of the people it occupies, especially those who are thought of as non-white, because it is a thoroughly racist nation. A superpower military allows them to act out this characteristic with impunity.¶ American racism allows its citizens to imagine that they are doing the people of Pakistan a favor, by sending drones to deal death without warning from the skies. The U.S. calls Pakistan an ally, when polls consistently show that its people harbor more hatred and fear of the U.S. than any other people in the world. The Pakistanis know the U.S. long propped up their military dictators, and then threatened to blow the country to Kingdom Come after 9/ll, if the U.S. military wasn’t given free rein. They know they are viewed collectively as less than human by the powers in Washington – and, if they don’t call it racism, we should, because we know our fellow Americans very well.¶ The U.S. lost any hope of leaving a residual military force in Iraq when it showed the utterly racist disrespect of Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison, the savage leveling of Fallujah, the massacres in Haditha and so many other places well known to Iraqis, if not the American public, and the slaughter of 17 civilians stuck at a traffic circle in Nisour Square, Baghdad. What people would agree to allow such armed savages to remain in their country if given a choice?¶ The United States was conceived as an empire built on the labor of Blacks and the land of dead natives, an ever-expanding sphere of exploitation and plunder – energized by an abiding and general racism that is, itself, the main obstacle to establishing a lasting American anti-war movement. But, despite the peace movement’s weaknesses, the people of a world under siege by the Americans will in due time kick them out – because to live under barbarian racists is not a human option.

#### Covert loopholes make the plan ineffective anyways

Lohmann 13 [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

### A2 Perm

#### 4.) Masking disad –

Douglas-Bowers, 13 -- Hampton Institute Politics and Government Department Chair

[Devon, "Beyond Drones: Combating the System of Militarism and Imperialism," Foreign Policy Journal, 8-7-13, www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/08/07/beyond-drones-combating-the-system-of-militarism-and-imperialism/, accessed 8-30-13, mss]

On September 11th, I will be attending an anti-drone demonstration in Union Square, NYC. This will be my first protest and I am quite excited. Obviously, the main goal of this demonstration is to protest against the use of drones around the world which kill innocents under the guise of attacking terrorists. While I welcome this protest, we must realize that this demonstration is not enough; that focusing on drones is not enough. We must battle the ‘War On Terror’ overall, as drones are only a small part of that. The global drone attacks started under Bush and have continued and massively expanded under Obama, with Obama going so far as to assassinate four US citizens (officially speaking). Yet, while this is extremely problematic, it is a symptom of America’s global militarism. Contrary to popular thinking, this global militarism didn’t start in the Bush era, but rather in the time of FDR, with World War II, and has continued and intensified since then. The US has, overtly, either already been involved in or started new wars/conflicts every single decade since the 1940s. This has created destruction all over the world, not just physically in terms of destroyed infrastructure, but mentally[1], historically[2], economically[3], and socially[4]. However, the problems go beyond just the military sphere. It has leaked into American society, and specifically into the social realm and how the American people relate to our government. Socially, this militarism has gone and allowed Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism to flourish in American society. It can be seen in everything, from attacks on mosques[5] to anti-Muslim ads[6]. This hatred and racism has heavily infected every part of our society to the point where it is seen as “OK” for TV pundits to spew anti-Muslim hatred. Americans’ relationship with their government has greatly changed ever since the ‘War on Terror’ was launched. While the government had previously spied on American citizens[7] (and even assassinated some[8]), it was mainly on those whom the government deemed a threat to the status quo. Now, the situation has become much more drastic, with the government spying on all US citizens[9], and has given itself the legal authority to not only indefinitely detain them without trial[10], but also to assassinate them (Assassination on US soil is still possible, given the fact that there are problems with Attorney General Holder’s letter to Rand Paul.[11]). At every level, the very people who are supposed to represent Americans have been complicit in allowing Americans to be spied upon and their civil liberties to be destroyed.[12] There has been such a breakdown in the rule of law that there are even secret interpretations of law[13] that the American people can be subjected to, but not know of. This growing authoritarianism must be confronted as well. Economically, corporations have profited quite handsomely[14] from the continuous wars of aggression around the world, as well as from the business of spying on Americans[15]. They are only able to do this because there is an economic incentive to create weapons of war and espionage, and to use those to great effect. In order to fight against militarism more broadly, such companies should be targeted for boycotts, and information campaigns should reveal to the public exactly who these companies are and how they are profiting off exploiting their customers’ information. There is a psychological battle to be held as well. The American people have become accustomed to their country being in a perpetual state of war. In many ways, some have become complacent at best, and, at worst, will actually support the ‘humanitarian interventions’ launched by the Obama administration. Just like with the drone debate, we should also work to have people realize that, while the names and terminology may have changed, the death and destruction have remained the same. This is especially important for those on the left, as there are many liberals whose hypocrisy has been revealed by condemning Bush’s wars of aggression, but support interfering in the affairs of sovereign nations now that Obama is at the helm. We must combat these hypocritical and uninvolved minds, lest we allow these problems to perpetuate. We must combat what Martin Luther King Jr. called “the giant triplets of racism, militarism, and economic exploitation” if we are to mount a truly successful attack on the drone war. The drone wars are a byproduct of the ‘War on Terror’ and its associated effects at home and abroad. If we do not look at this interconnected system, we will, in a way, be wasting our time as we will only be cutting off a branch of a tree rather than getting to the roots. We must go beyond drones.

#### 6.) Authority disad –

Beier, 11 – McMaster University political science professor

[J. Marshall, "Dangerous Terrain: Re-Reading the Landmines Ban through the Social Worlds of the RMA," Contemporary Security Policy, 32:1, April 2011, 159-175, accessed 9-12-13, mss]

Although turned to a more progressive purpose, the rhetorical /discursive strategies of the landmine ban effect and work through a similar disturbance of sites of responsibility. The success of the mine ban movement owes in no small measure to the marking of antipersonnel landmines as 'bad' weapons - a move that has enabled even states that have widely used mines to join in denouncing them as a humanitarian scourge without simultaneously repudiating recourse to militarized violence more generally. At the campaign level and with the specific practical objective of securing the broadest possible ban on landmines, this was a very well conceived approach. Indeed, had this strategy not been adopted, it is unlikely that the movement would have swayed many - if any - states to the cause. But practically expedient though it may have been, it is also contingent on putting responsibility out of sight. Like errant cruise missiles. landmines intend nothing. What makes them bad, then, speaks not of disposition, but rather a technological limitation resulting in an objective property of indiscriminacy. While this might at first seem suggestive of the need for a technological solution. recall that, in deference to the goal of a com- plete prohibition, the mine ban movement quite rightly worked to foreclose the possi- bility of recourse to "˜smart mines`. Though this might appear to mark it decidedly apart from the war-enabling technologies of the RMA and their part in refashioning the bases of legitimacy in contemporary warfare, the mystification of responsibility so crucial to the ban reveals some disturbing points of intersection. On first gloss, the approach of the mine ban movement seems quite clearly to disavow any recourse to "˜better` technology as a fix for landmine indiscriminacy. The importance of this cannot be overstated since, as has been the case with the RMA, distinguishing between "˜good` and "˜bad` weapons raises the spectre of a like distinction in terms of the conduct of those who use them - a distinction not always well sustained by the actual consequences of their use. In refusing to concede that some mines might be less pernicious than others, therefore, the move- ment simultaneously refused all bases of legitimacy in mine use that might otherwise have been claimed by the technologically advantaged and denied to those less so. But things become rather more problematic when considered from without the narrow context of the landmines issue. While the rhetorical casting of mines as bad proved a remarkably effective strategy in pursuit of a ban, it only makes sense if it in fact is imagined that there are somewhere 'good' weapons. Since it is not killing per se but killing with landmines that is rendered indefensible, the use of other presumably more discriminating weapons is lent a certain legitimacy it might not otherwise have enjoyed. And this is revealing of the important sense in which the core claims of the mine ban contribute to the reproduction of essential ideational bases of the 'new American way of war'. Inviting none of the cynicism about motives that might have attached to a wholly state-led initiative, the central involvement of civil society actors in the mine ban movement - well known and respected peace and human rights advocacy groups among them - both naturalizes and valorizes a much larger constellation of claims to meaningful discriminacy, whether overt or subsumed. Pressing for a ban on landmines thus involved the complete disaggregation of this one issue not only from peace activism in general, but from the more particular realm of disarmament advocacy as well, parcelling it off in such a way as to suggest that there are more effective ways to do the sorts of things landmines are intended to do

#### 7.) Only confronting issues of sovereignty allows us to break free of the circular political practies that entrench militarism

Wadiwel 02 (Dinesh Joesph, completing a doctorate at the University of Western Sydney, 2K2, “Cows and Sovereignty: Biopower and Animal Life” Borderlands E-Journal Vol. 1 # 2 <http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol1no2_2002/wadiwel_cows.html>)

Such a political program has far reaching consequences, both for Western sovereignty, and the way that the business of politics is conducted. The living population of the earth has inherited a vision of sovereign power, which has spread cancerously into even the most seemingly inaccessible aspects of everyday life. This vision commands all, claims legitimacy for all, and determines the conduct of living for all within its domain. Politics ‘as we know it’ is caught inextricably in the web of sovereign power, in such a way that it seems that modern political debate cannot help but circulate around the same, routine issues: "What is the appropriate legislative response?"; "Is it within the State’s powers to intervene in this particular conflict?"; "How can we ensure the citizen’s rights are maintained in the face of the state?". To challenge such an encompassing and peremptory political discourse — where every question implies the sovereign absolutely, and every decision made refers to life itself — would require the most intensive rethinking of the way in which territory, governance and economy are imagined. In this sense, whilst Agamben’s analysis of bare life, and Foucault’s theory of bio-power, provide a means by which to assess the condition of non-human life with respect to sovereign power, the political project must reach beyond these terms, and embrace an intertwining of the human and the non-human: an intersection which may be found in the animal life shared by both entities.

## 1NR – Case

### Coop

#### Drone secrecy is the norm of the Obama administration – May’s disclosure of information was calibrated to avoid public scrutiny.

Shah, ‘8/13 [Naureen Shah is an advocacy adviser at Amnesty International USA and author of several studies on the impact of US drone strikes; “Obama Has Not Delivered on May’s Promise of Transparency on Drones”; August 17, 2013; <http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/obama-has-not-delivered-mays-promise-transparency-drones?paging=off>

The past two weeks have seen an escalation in drone strikes more dramatic than any since 2009. The media estimate that more than 37 people have died in a series of strikes in Yemen. The US government has refused to officially acknowledge the strikes surge or reports of potentially unlawful deaths – just as it did, for years, refuse to confirm reports of the more than 300 drone strikes in Pakistan. On drones, secrecy is business as usual – and it carries on. Earlier this summer, however, there was hope for a different way forward. In late May, the White House released more information about US drone strikes than it ever had before. Following a major address on national security by President Obama, the government pledged to keep sharing "as much information as possible". In fact, since May, the White House has not officially released any new information on drone strikes (though leaks still abound). While NSA surveillance has taken center-stage, the government's policy of secrecy and obfuscation on drones persists, too. Past critics of the drone program – ranging from Senator Rand Paul (Republican, Kentucky) to Senator Ron Wyden (Democrat, Oregon) – should take notice. It is time to renew and expand the demand for answers about who is being killed. Instead of acknowledging the new strikes and describing a coherent policy and legal approach, the government has again chosen to selectively disclose information that raises more questions than it answers. Thus, an unattributed leak to the New York Times on Monday served up a major policy change in the form of a morsel, with little elaboration, that a recent terrorist threat has "expanded the scope of people we could go after". So, the question of whom the United States believes it can kill in drone strikes remains, as it ever was, full of unknowns. A handful of bullet-points on the government's "policy standards" for using lethal force, which the White House released in May concurrently with the president's national security speech, initially appeared to provide some guidance. But it expressly does not apply in "extraordinary circumstances", and since the embassy closures of earlier this month could be interpreted as providing such justification, the memorandum may not be relevant to the latest spate of strikes in Yemen. The White House could clarify this issue; better yet, it could move beyond conveniently malleable policy standards and describe how the government applies existing international law. Instead, the White House has again chosen to operate secretly and under rules of its own creation, which may permit killing individuals under a concept of "imminence" (of threat) that departs radically from all conventional interpretations of the law. Even more damning is that, in the absence of any commitment to investigating credible allegations of unlawful deaths, the United States appears indifferent to the question of who is actually dying in drone strikes. President Obama admitted in May that four US citizens had been killed, three of whom – including 16-year-old Abdulrahman Aal-Awlaki – he admitted were not intended targets. But the president did not define the identities of the more than 4,000 other people killed, or specifically address reports that a significant number of the dead – in assessments varying between 400 and nearly 1,000, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism – were civilians. When the president acknowledges four deaths of US citizens, but not 4,000 deaths of non-Americans, he signals to the world a callous and discriminatory disregard for human life. Perhaps only a fraction of these 4,000 deaths were unlawful. But acknowledging and investigating these deaths is a matter of dignity and justice – for the survivors of strikes, their communities and their countrymen. When deaths are found to be unlawful, victims' families and survivors have a right to reparation. Refusing to investigate deaths is a matter of disrespect both for international law and for the public's right to know the full truth. Many critics, before President Obama's May address, feared that foreign governments would follow the US to lead and conduct secret drone strikes without regard for international law. They should still be concerned about the precedent the US government is setting: refusing to investigate or be held accountable for wrongful deaths. The risk now is not just that the late May reforms on drone strikes were half-measures, but that they were calibrated to merely reassure the public, defuse criticism, and avert longer, harder scrutiny of whether the government's actions are lawful and right. A token dose of transparency may remove the sting of government secrecy, but it does not cure the disease.

### Warming

#### Allowing global warming to occur destroys the concept of a world by proving the inevitable failures of human intervention. This reconnects us with nonhumans, providing meaning to our last dying moments, means only the alternative solves value to life.

Morton 12, (Timothy Morton is a Professor of Literature and Environment at the University of California – Davis. January 11, 2012. “Peak Nature.” <http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/98/peak-nature.html>)

The second area of concern is historical, namely the way in which current ecological crises such as global warming and the sixth mass extinction event have thrown into sharp relief the notion of world. It is as if humans are losing their world, and their idea of world (including the idea that they ever had one), at one and the same time. This is at best highly disorienting. In this historical moment, the concept world is thrown into sharp relief by circumstances demanding conscious human intervention. Working to transcend our notion of world is important at this moment. Like a mannerist painting that stretches the rules of classicism to breaking point, global warming has stretched our world to breaking point. Human beings lack a world for a very good reason. This is simply because no entity at all has a world, or as Graham Harman puts it, “there is no such thing as a ‘horizon.’” Let’s think about one way in which global warming abolishes the idea of a horizon. This would be the timescales involved – yes, timescales in the plural. There are three of them. We could call these, in turn, the frightening, the horrifying, and the petrifying. 1) Frightening timescale. It will take several hundred years for cold ocean waters (assuming there are any) to absorb about 75% of the excess CO2. 2) Horrifying timescale. It will then take another 30,000 years or so for most of the remaining 25% to be absorbed by igneous rocks. The half-life of plutonium is 24,100 years. 3) Petrifying timescale. The final 7% will be around 100,000 years from now. There is a real sense in which “forever” is far easier on the mind than these very large timescales, what I call very large finitude. Hyperobjects produce very large finitude, scales of time and space that are finite and for that reason humiliatingly difficult for humans to visualize. Forever makes you feel important. But 100,000 years makes you wonder whether you can imagine 100,000 anything. It seems rather abstract to imagine that a book, for instance, is 100,000 words long. The “world” as the significant totality of what is the case is strictly unimaginable, and for a good reason: it doesn’t exist. What is left if we aren’t the world? Intimacy. We have lost the world but gained a soul, as it were – the entities that coexist with us obtrude on our awareness with greater and greater urgency. Our era is witness to the emergence of a renewed Aristotelianism, an object-oriented ontology that thinks essence is right here, not in some beyond. It’s precisely the magical amazement of things like stones, beetles, doors, red hot chili peppers, Nirvana, Bob Geldof, quasars and cartoon characters in the shape of Richard Nixon’s head that truly has to be explained, not explained away. Three cheers for the so-called end of the world, then, since this moment is the beginning of history … and the end of the human dream that reality is significant for humans alone. Let us welcome the prospect of forging new alliances between humans and nonhumans alike, now that we have stepped out of the cocoon of world.

### A2 Securitization

#### Securitization causes realism to co-opt the plan – erases the west’s role in environmental destruction and causes serial policy failure

Kumari 12 (Parmila, Masters in International Relations; educated at University of Nottingham and The University of Birmingham, Securitising The Environment: A Barrier To Combating Environment Degradation Or A Solution In Itself?, [www.e-ir.info/2012/01/29/securitising-the-environment-a-barrier-to-combating-environment-degradation-or-a-solution-in-itself/](http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/29/securitising-the-environment-a-barrier-to-combating-environment-degradation-or-a-solution-in-itself/))

 “The Dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems.” (Barnett 2001:137) The realist take on ‘security’ in the post-WWII period still holds a firm grasp today, so that the state is still the referent object of security and it is still its sovereignty which is to be secured against the threat of states. The problem is that, in the context of the environment, this makes no sense because the traditional focus of national security (interstate violence) has nothing to do with the focus of environmental degradation (human impact on the environment). Furthermore, talking of national security is too restrictive because a state’s ecological footprint may cross its sovereign domain. The wealthiest 20% of the world’s population consume 84% of all paper, use 87% of the world’s vehicles and emit 53% of all C0². Yet those least responsible suffer the effects the most. This is because wastes are exported to and resources come from the Southern poorer countries, so that their lands experience resource depletion and extraction (Barnett 2001:13). A focus on national security selects the military, because environmental degradation is viewed as having the potential to destabilise regional balances of power (Hough 2004:13-16). One only wonders how the military alone could prevent the effects of depletion and extraction. The environmental-conflict literature is a good example where traditional national security concerns have been linked with the environment. The narrative within this discourse is that environment degradation will lead to resource scarcities, which will make the developing countries more militarily confrontational towards the industrialised states (Barnett 2001:38). Conflict over escarce resources undermines the security of the state (Detraz and Betsill 2009:305), so it is the state which is to be protected. Emphasis on such an account is undesirable for many reasons. Firstly, it is untrue that the only consequence of environmental degradation is conflict. Bogardi and Brauch have noted how environmental security involves freedom from want (economic and social security dimensions), freedom from hazard impacts (natural or human-induced hazards as effects of environmental degradation) and freedom from fear (violence and conflict) (Brauch 2008: 17-8). This demonstrates how conflict is but one consequence of degradation. Environmental-conflict literature ignores the root socioeconomic causes and hazard impact dimensions of environmental security; a focus on which would lead to conclusions of undertaking non-military efforts like disaster preparedness, adaptation, mitigation, early warning systems etc (Brauch 2008:17-8), and economic solutions like pricing goods to reflect the costs of their provision (Mathews (1989:172). Secondly, the assertion that environmental degradation is a primary reason of conflict is purely speculative (Barnett 2003:10). Barnett suggests that the ‘evidence’ provided in support is a collection of historical events chosen to support the conflict-scarcity storyline and reify the realist assumption that eventually humans will resort to violence (Barnett 2001:66). This is as opposed to acknowledging that humans are equally capable of adapting. Thirdly, research shows that it is abundance of resources which drives competition, not scarcity (Barnet 2003:11). This makes sense because any territorial conquest to obtain resources will be expensive. A poor country suffering from resource scarcity would not be able to afford an offensive war (Deudney 1990: 309-11). The second and third points mean that environmental-conflict literature counteracts any attempts at solving the problem of environmental degradation. The discourse attributes high intentionality to people-because of scarcity they decide to become violent. This ignores the fact that human actions are not intended to harm the environment. The high intentionality given to people prevents them from being seen as victims who need help. Instead they are pictured as threats to state security. This view can exacerbate ethnic tensions as the state uses minority groups as scapegoats for environmental degradation. It also means that only those involved in conflict are relevant to environmental security, not those who are vulnerable (Detraz and Betsill 2009:307-15). In this way the South is scripted as “primeval Other” (Barnett 2001:65), where order can only be maintained by the intervention of the North, rather than by the provision of aid. The North’s agency in creating the environmental problems is completely erased. Instead environmental degradation is seen from the perspective of the individual state, questioning how it could affect the state, i.e. increased migration (Allenby 2000:18) and this leads to the adoption of narrow policies. Saad has said that securitising the environment in this way allows the North to justify intervening and forcing developing nations to follow policies which encapsulate the North’s norms (Saad 1991:325-7). In this way the powerful become stronger, and the weak weaker. This view may affect the South’s relations with the North. For example, Detraz and Betsill have commented on tensions between the North and South in the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change. Only 29% of the Southern states compared to 70% of Northern speakers supported the idea of the Security Council being a place to develop a global response to climate change. The reasons for this difference was that shifting decision-making to the Security Council would make Southern states unable to promote efficiently their interests in obtaining resources for climate adaptation and mitigation plans. Furthermore, Egypt and India argued that in suggesting this Northern countries were avoiding their responsibilities for controlling greenhouse gases, by trying to “shift attention to the need to address potential climate-related conflict in the South” (Detraz and Betsill 2009:312). In this way environmental security becomes a barrier because the traditional (realist) concept of security is used to immobilise any action towards dealing with the root causes of environmental degradation.